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This article explores the post-Brexit EU-UK trade relations as they can be anticipated 
on the eve of the approaching exit day on 31 October 2019. A key piece of the Brexit 
negotiation concerned the issue of future trade relations between the UK and the EU 
after the withdrawal. The first part of the article discusses the framework of EU-UK 
future trade relationship as it emerges through the stand taken by the parties during 
the negotiations and in the final acts, the Withdrawal Agreement and the Political 
Declaration. In its second part, the article focuses on WTO constraints to the UK post-
Brexit international trade with third countries, including those with which the EU 
currently has trade agreements in place, which will become inapplicable to the UK 
upon its exit from the EU. The analysis shows that taking back control over the trade 
policy will not be an easy task for the UK, leaving the EU with or without a deal. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
On 29 March 2017 the United Kingdom (UK) formally notified the European 
Council of its intention to leave the European Union (EU). In November 
2018, before the end of the two-year time limit established by Article 50 TEU 
to achieve an agreement on the UK departing terms, the EU and the UK 
closed an intense negotiation with the signature of the Withdrawal 
Agreement and the Political Declaration setting out the framework for the 
future relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom.1 
A key piece of the Brexit negotiation concerned the issue of future trade 
relations between the UK and the EU after the withdrawal. However, as is 
well known, the UK Parliament has refused to accept the results of the 
negotiation. At the date of finalisation of this paper2 it is not clear whether 
Brexit will occur with or without a deal – if at all.  
The main initial target of the UK was to associate the negotiations on the 
terms of withdrawal with those concerning the two parties' future 
cooperation. However, at the EU's insistence the definition of the 
framework for the future trade relationship was pushed back to the very last 
phase of the negotiation and is not enshrined in a binding agreement but 
 
1  Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy 
Community [2019] OJ CI 144/1. 
2 This article was completed at the end of September 2019. 
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rather in a political declaration. The different positions of the parties 
converged in the Political Declaration, a non-binding legal instrument open 
to different interpretations and developments. The only trade arrangement 
binding for the parties is the so-called 'backstop' solution for avoiding a hard 
border between Ireland and Northern Ireland, agreed by the parties in the 
Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland that forms an integral part of the 
withdrawal agreement.3  
In its first part, this article discusses the features of future EU-UK post-
Brexit trade relations according to the positions manifested by the parties 
during the negotiation and in the final acts, taking into account the position 
adopted by Prime Minister Boris Johnson's government, notably with his 
letter to EU Council President Donald Tusk on 19 August 2019.4 In its 
second part, the paper focuses on World Trade Organization (WTO) 
constraints to the UK's post-Brexit international trade with third countries, 
including those with which the EU currently has trade agreements in place 
which will become inapplicable to the UK upon exit. The so-called 'roll-over' 
– aimed for by the UK – of existing Free Trade Agreements (FTA) and other 
trade arrangements currently in place between the EU and third countries 
requires the conclusion of new agreements by the UK. They are meant to 
enter into force subject to the exit of the UK from the EU, the end of any 
Transition Period and the ability of the UK to conduct thereupon its own 
international trade policy freely. The latter is dependent on the UK not being 
encumbered by the restrictions stemming from the UK being part of a 
custom union with the EU, as currently envisaged by the 'backstop'. 
The conclusions of our analysis show the considerable constraints that the 
UK faces in devising such a policy and entering into such agreements, 
including with countries such as the US which currently have no FTAs in 
place with the EU. Since the UK-EU trade represents for the UK about half 
 
3  According to Article 182 of the withdrawal agreement, 'The Protocol on 
Ireland/Northern Ireland, the Protocol relating to the Sovereign Base Areas in 
Cyprus, the Protocol on Gibraltar, and Annexes I to IX shall form an integral part 
of this Agreement'. 
4 Letter of Prime Minister Boris Johnson to European Council President Donald 
Tusk (19 August 2019) <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/ 
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/826166/20190819_PM_letter_to_H
is_Excellency_Mr_Donald_Tusk.pdf > accessed 6 September 2019. 
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of the total import-export of the UK5, the legal framework of this trade 
relationship affects the terms of any other agreement with other WTO 
members. As such, this represents a situation of uncertainty as to the future 
trade relations of the UK with the EU. 
II. THE NARROW PATH TOWARDS AN EU-UK ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP 
POST-BREXIT 
1. Past and future in the interpretation of Article 50 TEU: the separation of the trade 
negotiations  
Article 50 TEU does not draw a clear line between the undefined 
'arrangements […] for the withdrawal' to be included in a bilateral treaty 
between the Union and the exiting member, and 'the future relations' to be 
taken into account in the negotiation of the treaty.  
This vague formulation of the provision allowed at the very beginning of the 
Brexit process two opposite lines of interpretation: either a comprehensive 
negotiation process, combining both the past and the future, or a negotiation 
trajectory defined by a clear separation between the assessment of the past 
and discussion on the future.  
Prime Minister May's letter triggering Article 50 TEU expressed the will of 
the UK to negotiate and agree both the terms of separation and the future 
relations in parallel.6 This proposal of the UK government met, however, 
with a firm opposition from the EU, based on the very terms of Article 50. 
The European Council's first Guidelines7 split the negotiations in two 
 
5 'In 2018 the UK exported £289 billion of goods and services to other EU member 
states. This is equivalent to 46% of total UK exports. Goods and services imports 
from the EU were worth £345 billion (54% of the total)': House of Commons 
Library, Briefing Paper, 'Statistics on UK-EU trade', 7851, (24 July 2019) 4.  
6 Letter of Prime Minister Theresa May to European Council President Donald 
Tusk (29 March 2017) <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/XT-
20001-2017-INIT/en/pdf>  accessed 19 August 2019. 
7 According to Article 50 TEU, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an 
agreement with the withdrawing state 'in the light of the guidelines provided by the 
European Council'. In the Brexit negotiation, the European Council adopted three 
set of Guidelines. The first one was adopted at the beginning of the process one 
month after the UK withdrawal notification: European Council Guidelines (April 
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phases: a first phase exclusively devoted to the arrangements for an orderly 
withdrawal and a second phase, conditioned by reaching sufficient progress 
and a satisfactory agreement on the first phase issues as assessed by the EU 
Council, devoted to achieving an overall understanding on the framework for 
the future relationship. The main EU legal justification was that an 
agreement on a future relationship between the EU and the UK would be 
'finalised and concluded once the United Kingdom has become a third 
country.'8 Behind the legal argument, there was the determination of the EU 
to subordinate the negotiations on the future to reaching an agreement on 
the three paramount objectives of the Article 50 negotiations: first, the 
protection of the rights of EU citizens presently residing in the UK and those 
of UK citizens living in the EU;9 second, the settlement of the UK financial 
obligations towards the Union; and third, avoiding the re-establishment of an 
hard border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland.10  
The roadmap proposed by the European Council was accepted by the UK. 
Indeed, in the Terms of Reference for the Article 50 TEU negotiations,11 
agreed by both parties, the issues on the table were the Citizens' rights, the 
Financial Settlement, other separation issues and a dialogue on 
Ireland/Northern Ireland. No mention was made as to the future 
relationship between the Union and the UK.  
Legally speaking, the position of the EU was correct. According to Article 50, 
the withdrawal agreement is a sole Union agreement, concluded by a Council 
decision adopted by a qualified majority vote and subject to the consent of 
the European Parliament. An agreement on the future relationship falls 
within a different scope of the EU's external action, since the UK will forfeit 
its membership and become a third country. The agreement should have a 
different legal base: Article 207 TFEU in case future relationships were 
limited to trade matters, or Article 217 TFEU in case of a wider area of 
 
29 2017) EUCO XT 20004/17, para II <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/ 
document/XT-20004-2017-INIT/it/pdf> accessed 19 August 2019.  
8 Ibid para 5. 
9 See contribution by Catherine Barnard in this volume. 
10 See contribution by John Doyle & Eileen Connelly in this volume. 
11 Terms of Reference for the Article 50 TEU negotiations, <https://ec.europa. 
eu/commission/publications/terms-reference-article-50-treaty-european-union-
negotiations_en> accessed 29 April 2019. 
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cooperation extended to EU policy areas other than trade and putting the 
base for deeper cooperation in the form of Association.12 
2. The EU and UK negotiations: trade in goods 
The first formal step towards a definition of a framework for the future 
relationship arrived only at the end of March 2018 when the European 
Council delivered the third set of Guidelines – delivered by the EU, rather 
than by the UK.13 This does not mean that the UK did not engage in political 
discussion on the kind of economic and trade relations it intended to 
establish with the EU.14 However, the British political elite was highly 
divided on the kind of future trade relation it sought with the EU, and the 
UK government only formalised its proposal in the White Paper commonly 
known as the Chequers plan in July 2018.15 The time-lag uncovers the weak 
negotiating position of the UK.16 When the 585-page Draft Agreement on 
the Withdrawal was agreed at negotiators' level on 14 November 2018, the 
common ground for the negotiation of the future relationship was outlined 
 
12 Takis Tridimas, 'Article 50: An Endgame without an End?' (2016) King's Law 
Journal 297; Hannes Hofmeister,'"Should I Stay or Should I Go?" A Critical 
Analysis of the Right to Withdraw from the EU' (2010) 16 ELJ 589; Christophe 
Hillion, 'Withdrawal Under Article 50 TEU: An Integration-Friendly Process' 
(2018) 55 CML Rev 29; Piet Eeckhout and Eleni Frantziou, 'Brexit and Article 50 
TEU: A constitutionalist reading' (2017) 54 CML Rev 695.  
13 European Council Guidelines (March 23, 2018) EUCO XT 20001/18 (hereafter 
2018 Guidelines) <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/33504/23-euco-art50-
guidelines-it.pdf> accessed 19 August 2019. 
14 Prime Minister Theresa May, speech on our future economic partnership with the 
European Union, Guildhall (2 March 2018). 
15 White Paper of the UK Government on 'The future relationship between the 
United Kingdom and the European Union' (17 July 2018), Cm (9593), (hereafter 
Chequers plan) <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/ 
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/786626/The_Future_Relationship_between
_the_United_Kingdom_and_the_European_Union_120319.pdf> accessed 19 
August 2019.  
16 See contribution by Emily Jones in this volume. 
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in a seven-page document defining general principles and aspirations 
consistent with different forms of trade agreements.17  
In the 2018 Guidelines, the European Council reaffirmed the Union's 
determination to build a close partnership with the UK, covering 'trade and 
economic cooperation as well as other areas, in particular the fight against 
terrorism and international crime, as well as security, defence and foreign 
policy.'18 Once again, it was left to the European Council to draw the road 
map and the formal outcome: 'the negotiations on the overall understanding 
of the framework for the future relationship […] will be elaborated in a 
political declaration accompanying and referred to in the Withdrawal 
Agreement.'19 In other words, no binding instruments for the future, just a 
political commitment from both parties. A free trade agreement (FTA) could 
be finalised and concluded only once the UK is no longer a Member State. 
In response to the red lines laid down by Prime Minister Theresa May in her 
various political speeches,20 the European Council adopted its own red lines 
for a future trade deal. They were: the UK cannot have all the benefits of 
membership of the single market without the corresponding obligations; the 
preservation of the integrity of the single market, meaning unity of the four 
freedoms and the exclusion for the UK to participate in the single market on 
a sector-by-sector base; the Union autonomy in its decision-making process; 
and the central role of the Court of Justice of the European Union.  
 
17 Outline of the political declaration setting out the framework for the future 
relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, as agreed at negotiators' level on 14 November 2018 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/outline_of_the_politi 
cal_declaration.pdf> accessed 19 August 2019.  
18 2018 Guidelines (n 9) 1. 
19 Ibid 3. 
20 Ending jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in the UK; ending free 
movement of EU citizens into the UK; a fully independent UK trade policy; and 
no compulsory contributions to the EU budget. See Prime Minister Theresa May, 
Plan for Britain, including the 12 priorities that the UK government will use to 
negotiate Brexit, Lancaster House, London (17 January 2017); Prime Minister 
Theresa May, Florence speech: a new era of cooperation and partnership between 
the UK and the EU, Florence (23 September 2017). 
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According to the 2018 Guidelines, the FTA would cover trade in goods, trade 
in services and access to public procurement markets, investments and 
protection of intellectual property rights. Differently, in the long-awaited 
Chequers Plan, the UK proposed a bilateral free trade area for goods, 
proposing that it could be established without introducing border controls. 
The UK proposal was in line with the EU position expressed in the 2018 
Guidelines in terms of avoiding tariffs and quotas, but differs in its approach 
to border controls. In the traditional dichotomy between customs unions 
and free trade areas defined by Art. XXIV of the GATT,21 only a customs 
union in which Member States adopt a common external tariff eliminates the 
necessity of border controls on the origin of goods. The UK proposal was 
intended instead to conciliate the freedom of the UK to autonomously set its 
own tariff levels, as in a classical free trade area, with the avoidance at the 
same time of 'friction at the border' (as in custom unions), notwithstanding 
the possible introduction of tariffs, quotas, and checks for health and safety. 
This tailor-made new approach to trade in goods was elaborated not just to 
allow a smooth circulation of final products, but also to 'protect the uniquely 
integrated supply chains and "just-in-time" processes that have developed 
across the UK and the EU over the last 40 years.'22 The two pillars of the UK 
proposal were two 'innovative' instruments: the Common Rulebook and the 
Facilitated Customs Arrangement (FCA).23  
 
21 Article XXIV of the GATT is the provision allowing for regional integration 
exceptions. The most-favoured-nation (MFN) obligation (Art I GATT) can be 
derogated to permit the formation of customs unions and Free Trade Areas. In a 
customs union, the members must eliminate duties and 'other restrictive 
regulations of commerce' with respect to substantially all trade between them and 
they must apply substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce 
to their external trade. According to the GATT definition, the customs union 
members are required to eliminate internal trade barriers as well as establish a 
common commercial policy. Differently, in a free trade area members are only 
required to eliminate internal trade barriers. See Michal Ovádek and Ines 
Willemyns, 'International Law of Customs Unions: Conceptual Variety, Legal 
Ambiguity and Diverse Practice' (2019) EJIL 363: 'Article XXIV of the GATT 
contains the most important contemporary legal definition of the concept of a CU 
in international law.' 
22 Chequers Plan (n 15) 13. 
23 Ibid 16ff and 89ff. 
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The Common Rulebook would set forth the agreed rules on standards for 
goods, including agri-foods. In the 'desiderata' of UK these common rules 
would enable the UK and the EU to reduce or avoid border checks on the 
basis that common standards were observed. The implementation of the 
common regulation at the domestic level should be sufficient to qualify the 
goods for FTA treatment, meaning the respect of standards and regulations 
and the UK origin. The same would happen for EU27 exports to the UK. This 
system would depend in large measure on customs declarations and returns 
made by firms given 'trusted trader' status, and on maximum use of modern 
technology. It would ensure interoperability between UK and EU supply 
chains, and avoid the need for manufacturers to run separate production lines 
for the separate markets. The EU would continue to lead the definition of 
standards and the 'UK would make an upfront choice to commit by treaty to 
ongoing harmonisation with the relevant EU rules, with all those rules 
legislated for by Parliament or the devolved legislatures'.24  
The FCA would be the mechanism to allow the elimination of UK/EU border 
controls while permitting an independent UK international trade policy. 
According to the proposal, the UK would apply its own trade policy and 
tariffs to imports of goods intended for consumption in the UK, while for 
goods in transit for the EU that entered via the UK, the UK would apply the 
EU's tariffs and trade policy.25 The FCA would aim to eliminate the need for 
customs controls for trade in goods from the UK to the EU, including 
customs declarations for tariff classification purposes, routine rules of origin 
requirements, and entry and exit declarations, since the UK would act as 
agent for EU customs authorities. It would mean that the UK would 
guarantee the integrity of the EU customs union, ensuring that tariffs are 
properly applied and collected, and that EU standards for goods entering the 
EU via the UK are respected.  
The FCA proposal is unique in the context of international relations between 
sovereign entities. In fact, the system is founded on the outsourcing of a 
sovereign power (administration of customs) to another state. The UK was 
suggesting that the Union and its Member States give up their customs 
sovereignty to a third country, without reciprocity. The system would be 
 
24 Ibid 8. 
25 Ibid 16. 
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based on a full trust in a soon-to-be third country. However, due to its 
ineffective implementation of customs controls on imports from third 
countries, the UK as a member of the EU has not proved to be reliable in 
taking action to prevent customs evasion. Following an OLAF report and a 
Commission inspection, it emerged that the UK has under-valuated a fraud 
scheme relating to the importation of textiles and footwear originating in 
China since 2007,26 which has resulted in an infringement procedure pending 
against the UK.27 Despite having been asked to take appropriate risk control 
measures, according to the Commission the UK failed to take action to 
prevent the fraud. The UK's infringement of EU legislation resulted in losses 
to the EU budget amounting to EUR 2.7 billion during the period from 
November 2011 until December 2017.28  
It is not surprising that EU Chief Negotiator Michel Barnier rejected the UK 
proposal for a Facilitated Customs Arrangements, arguing that the EU could 
never agree to outsource any part of its customs administration to a non-
Member State.29 What would be the interest of a third country to improve 
the customs control on behalf of the EU and its financial interests? Without 
the incentive to reduce the national contribution to the EU budget and the 
pressure on UK taxpayers, and lacking the deterrent effect of the 
infringement procedure, what would be the UK's incentive to guarantee the 
correct implementation of foreign legislation? When the UK customs 
authorities will be requested to check the goods in transit for the EU, they 
may be tempted to facilitate trade with faster, seamless import procedures, 
instead of carrying out burdensome customs controls, in order to attract 
more traffic with fewer customs controls. As such, the implementation of a 
dual customs system by UK officials could create new loopholes originating 
from the different tariffs and trade policies. In fact, since in the aspirations 
 
26 European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), 'The OLAF Report 2017', 26. 
27 Commission v United Kingdom, Case C-213/19. 
28 European Commission, Formal notice Art. 258 TFEU (8 March 2018) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-1444_EN.htm> accessed 29 
April 2019; European Commission, Reasoned opinion Art 258 TFEU (24 
September 2018) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-5807_EN.htm> 
accessed 29 April 2019.    
29 European Commission, Press statement by Michel Barnier following the July 2018 
General Affairs Council (Article 50), STATEMENT 18/4626. 
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of the UK Government, the new UK trade policy should reduce the 
standards and the tariffs compared the current EU's ones,30 it is easy to 
foresee frauds to unduly extend the FTA treatment to non-UK origin goods. 
3. The EU and UK negotiations: trade in services 
It is important to note that the Free Trade Area would not extend to services. 
The Chequers Plan, searching for different market access rights for service 
providers, relies on the provisions of the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS).31 However, it does not accept one of its main principles, 
according to which FTAs are obliged to cover all modes of services supply and 
to have substantial sectoral coverage.32 The guiding philosophy seems instead 
to be exiting the single market for services, in exchange for the UK being 
allowed to deconstruct single market principles of free movement of 
persons.33 In fact, the proposal on services is a selective recourse to EU 
mutual recognition of professional qualifications legislation. This is done in 
order to reach more 'deep commitments' on market access and national 
treatment, to guarantee that foreign service providers are treated the same as 
equivalent local providers, with any exceptions kept to a minimum only for 
the business services.34  
 
30  'Britain’s destiny is to be a global champion of trading freedoms.' See the 
International Trade Secretary Liam Fox, 'Britain's place in the global trading 
system', policy Exchange, London (1 February 2019). 
31 The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is the only multilateral 
agreement regulating trade in services. It is one of the agreements administered by 
the WTO. Markus Krajewski, 'General Agreement on Trade in Services 
([1994]2011)' Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law [MPEPIL]. 
32 In general, on service trade according to GATS rules in a post-Brexit scenario see 
Adlung, Rudolf, 'Brexit from a WTO/GATS Perspective: Towards an Easy 
Divorce?' (2018) 52 Journal of World Trade 721–744. 
33 The GATS distinguishes between four modes of supplying services: cross-border 
trade, consumption abroad, commercial presence, and presence of natural persons. 
In the EU internal market, the distinction is less important since the free 
circulation of persons allows all the modes. The end of the free movement of people 
between the UK and EU implies that the delimitation of trade of services is strictly 
connected to the conditions of circulation of services providers and recipients.  
34 Chequers Plan (n 15) 26. 
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The end of free movement of people risks becoming a barrier to trade in 
services by preventing businesses form having access to skills and talent, a 
crucial concern for a number of sectors, especially professional services, 
financial services and technology. The approach adopted by the Chequers 
Plan is to deal with the issue of mobility of skilled workers and professionals 
by using the framework of services trade, shifting the issue of access to skills 
and labour from the realm of free circulation of people and workers, to access 
to particular jobs in selected service sectors. 
Concerning financial services, the Chequers Plan is based on abandoning the 
current system of 'passporting' based on the 'mutual recognition' principle 
covering many finance service areas as investments services, banking, 
insurance, insurance mediation, payment services and issuing electronic 
money. Instead, the UK proposal is to rely on a new economic and regulatory 
arrangement that is an expanded and modified version of the EU third-
country equivalence regimes, which provide limited access for some of its 
third-country partners to some areas of EU financial services markets. The 
limit of equivalence is twofold: instability and lack of comprehensiveness.35  
In the short run the UK regulatory regime will continue to be entirely 
equivalent to the one applicable among the EU27, but in the long run to 
maintain the equivalence means to negotiate standards and regulations with 
the EU, in view of the asserted autonomy of the UK to develop its own 
regulatory system. The White Paper proposes a number of processes 
designed to encourage continued convergence and to manage the process if 
the laws diverge, involving both parties. The regulatory autonomy also means 
the end of any supervisory control of EU organs, including the Commission 
and the European Supervisory Authorities, over the UK financial market and 
its actors. 
The current EU equivalence framework does not apply to all EU regulated 
financial services. Access may depend on the type of clients (eligible 
counterparty, professional or retail) and regimes are different for cross-
border operations and for established firms. From an EU legislative 
perspective, in order to expand the current equivalence regime into the new 
 
35 Eddy Wymeersch, 'Third-Country Equivalence and Access to the EU Financial 
Markets Including in Case of Brexit' (2018) 4 Journal of Financial Regulation 211. 
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economic and regulatory arrangement proposed by the UK it would be 
necessary to recast a number of directives.  
As such, the post-Brexit arrangement proposal on services seems as vague as 
it is unfeasible. It is completely blind to one of the EU's red lines, the integrity 
of the single market. As the EU Council recalled in its 2018 Guidelines:  
the four freedoms are indivisible and that there can be no "cherry picking" 
through participation in the Single Market based on a sector-by-sector 
approach, which would undermine the integrity and proper functioning of 
the Single Market.36 
4. Trade matters covered in the Withdrawal Agreement: application to the UK of 
EU FTAs and the issue of the Irish border 
The Withdrawal Agreement is a complex treaty consisting in 185 articles 
structured in six Parts (further divided into Titles and Chapters), three 
Protocols and nine Annexes. The main goal of the agreement is to provide 
legal protection of the status and rights derived from EU law to EU and UK 
citizens and their families affected by the UK's withdrawal, and to define a 
financial settlement to assess the financial obligations undertaken while the 
UK was a member and still due.  
As already highlighted, the Withdrawal Agreement does not deal with post-
Brexit trade relations and therefore does not protect acquired economic 
rights of businesses. The uncertainties for the EU businesses trading with and 
operating in the UK, and for UK businesses trading with and operating in the 
EU, are only temporarily addressed by a short transition period (ending on 31 
December 2020, with a possible extension for up to one or two years) of 
continuous application of the EU acquis to the UK. During this Transition 
Period the UK would not be participating in any EU institutions and 
agencies, although new EU rules would be applicable to the UK.37 
As per Article 129, the EU acquis in force during the transition period includes 
the international agreements concluded by the EU, or by Member States 
 
36 2018 Guidelines (n 13) 3. For a critical approach to the indivisibility of the four 
freedoms, see Catherine Barnard, 'Brexit and the EU Internal Market' in Federico 
Fabbrini (ed) The Law & Politics of Brexit (Oxford University Press 2017) 203.   
37 See contribution by Kenneth Armstrong in this volume. 
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acting on its behalf, or by the EU and its Member States acting jointly. While 
the UK continues to be bound by the obligations stemming from those 
agreements, at the same time it regains the power to 'sign and ratify 
international agreements in the areas of exclusive competence of the Union, 
provided those agreements do not enter into force or apply during the 
transition period, unless so authorised by the Union' (Article 129, para 4).  
From a trade perspective, the UK would remain part of the EU's common 
commercial policy until the end of the transition period and would still 
implement the EU's common external tariff, including preferential tariffs 
under the more than 40 FTAs that the EU has concluded. As indicated in a 
footnote at Article 129, '[t]he Union will notify the other parties to these 
agreements that during the transition period the United Kingdom is to be 
treated as a Member State for the purposes of these agreements'. This 
approach is however problematic from an international treaty law 
perspective. Since the UK participation to the FTAs is a direct consequence 
of EU membership, the change of status after its withdrawal eliminates the 
international obligation of the FTA partners to extend the market access to 
the UK even if the UK is treated by the EU as if it were still a member for the 
purpose of application of EU regulations. The notification of the EU to its 
partners sounds more like an invitation to these countries to go on treating 
the UK as a EU member in the absence of any strict obligation for the partner 
countries to do so.38 Their acceptance of the partner countries may also be 
 
38 Extending the territorial scope of application of a treaty to a third state needs the 
consent of all the parties to a treaty. The general rule regarding the amendments of 
a treaty requires the agreement between the parties (Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, Art 39) and the creation of rights and obligations for a third states 
needs the consent of the third state and the parties of the treaty (Arts 34, 35 and 36). 
The UK Government considered necessary an agreement of the parties 'to 
interpret relevant terms in these international agreements, such as "European 
Union" or "EU Member State", to include the UK […] The key requirement would 
be the clear agreement of the parties that the underlying treaty continued to apply 
to the UK during the implementation period'. UK Government, Technical Note 
on international Agreements during the Implementation Period (8 February 2018) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/technical-note-on-international-
agreements> accessed 21 August 2019. 
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tacit.39  
The most controversial part of the Withdrawal Agreement is the one 
addressing the Irish border. The Irish border question concerns the 
resolution of two conflicting aspirations: preserving the integrity of the Good 
Friday agreement,40 implying an open border between the UK and the 
Republic of Ireland, on one side; and satisfying the UK 'red-lines' of ending 
the single market principles on free movement, leaving the EU's customs 
union, and not having a separate regime for Northern Ireland in respect of 
the rest of the UK, on the other.  
The Irish border question is defined in Protocol 2 to the Withdrawal 
Agreement, which together with its ten Annexes accounts for 173 of the 585 
pages of the Withdrawal Agreement. The Protocol sets out the so-called 
'backstop' solution for avoiding a hard border between Ireland and Northern 
Ireland. In principle, the solution to the Irish border question is devolved to 
the future EU-UK arrangement negotiated under the Political Declaration. 
However, if the EU and UK fail to agree a solution by the time the transition 
period expires the 'backstop' would come into place. The core of this solution 
is the establishment of an 'ambitious customs arrangements' that would 
'build on the single customs territory'.41 The backstop means substantially 
that the whole UK would remain in a customs union with the EU.42  
This single customs territory between the UK and the EU entails the 
movement of goods on a duty and quota-free basis, with low levels of 
administrative obligation at the border, and a deep level of integration 
 
39 On these issues before the negotiations started see Giorgio Sacerdoti, 'The 
Prospects: The UK Trade Regime with the EU and the World – Options and 
Constraints Post- Brexit' in Federico Fabbrini (ed) The Law & Politics of Brexit 
(Oxford University Press 2017) 72-91. 
40 See contribution by John Doyle & Eileen Connelly in this volume. 
41 According to the Preamble of the Protocol, 'The Union and the United Kingdom 
[…] HAVING REGARD to the Union's and to the United Kingdom's common 
objective of a close future relationship, which will establish ambitious customs 
arrangements that build on the single customs territory provided for in this 
Protocol, in full respect of their respective legal orders'. 
42 Joseph Weiler, 'A Frontstop Approach to the Backstop Conundrum' (EJIL: Talk!, 
29 January 2019) <www.ejiltalk.org/a-frontstop-approach-to-the-backstop-
conundrum/> accessed 3 May 2019.  
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between the UK and the EU, particularly with respect to Northern Ireland.43 
Article 6 of Protocol 2 stipulates that a very large part of EU law, as defined 
in Annex 5, shall apply to the single customs territory. Annex 5, which runs 
close to 70 pages, is a list of the EU legislation on general matters, such as 
trade and customs, or the marketing of products, and specific matters, from 
animal health, to food safety, to motor vehicles to chemicals and pesticides. 
All these rules should be applied together with Articles 30 and 110 TFEU 'to 
and in the United Kingdom in respect of Northern Ireland'. Other annexes 
deal with harmonisations of the UK commercial policy with that of the EU, 
commitments on state aid, environmental protection, labour standards, and 
fair taxation. Services are not covered by the backstop. 
In particular, Article 3 of Annex 2, under the title 'Customs Tariff applicable 
to trade with third countries', provides that the UK shall align the tariffs and 
rules applicable in its customs territory with the Union's Common Customs 
Tariff, the Union's rules on the origin of goods and the Union's rules on the 
value of goods for customs purposes. Alignment means for the UK to 
implement the EU External Tariff without any voice in the related decision 
making process.44 The UK is, in fact, prevented from applying to its customs 
territory a customs tariff which is lower than the Common Customs Tariff, 
or from applying or granting in its customs territory tariff preferences on the 
basis of different rules of origin or from applying or granting in its customs 
territory any quotas, tariff-rate quotas or duty suspensions.  
 
43 The commitment of the UK Government to preserving the integrity of the UK's 
internal market by avoiding different regulatory regimes between Northern 
Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom excluded a customs union solution 
only for Northern Ireland. Joint report from the negotiators of the European 
Union and the United Kingdom Government on progress during phase 1 of 
negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the United Kingdom's orderly withdrawal 
from the European Union, para 50, <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/joint_report.pdf> accessed 22 August 2019.  
44 According to Art. 3.3 of the Annex, 'The United Kingdom shall be informed of any 
decision taken by the Union to amend the Common Customs Tariff, to suspend or 
reintroduce duties and any decision concerning quotas, tariff-rate quotas or duty 
suspensions in sufficient time for it to align itself with that decision. If necessary, 
consultations may be held in the Joint Committee.' 
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The EU's Common Customs Tariff, combined with the free circulation of 
goods in the single customs territory, implies that the UK must also grant free 
circulation to the goods from third countries which are in free circulation in 
the EU. This would undermine the leverage of the UK in negotiating wider 
free trade agreements with partners having already free access to its market 
of goods. This replicates the same limitations Turkey is facing, due to its 
participation in a customs union with the EU.45 
The Irish backstop has proved one of the most contemptuous issues blocking 
the acceptance of the Withdrawal Agreement by the UK Parliament. In the 
absence of a different solution under the backstop, the UK will be prevented 
from having its own independent trade policy, one of the main objectives of 
Brexit.46 The automatic application of the backstop, in the case of the parties 
failing to finalize an agreement on the future relationship by 31 December 
2020, means for the UK the definitive abdication of the ambition of an 
independent trade policy. 
5. The future trade regime and the Political Declaration 
The Political Declaration is a non-binding statement of intent framing the 
future relationship between the EU and the UK.47 The framework of a future 
relationship, which according to Article 50 TEU should have been taken into 
account during the withdrawal process, in the Brexit case arrived only at the 
end of the negotiation when the terms of separation had already been settled 
and transposed in a draft international treaty. Non-alignment between the 
assessment of the past and the scheme of future relations is the product of 
both parties' conduct: the EU's for demanding that negotiations on the 
future relationship start only once the UK had left the Union, and the UK's 
for lacking a clear vision on the kind of relationship it wished to build with 
 
45 For an updated presentation for these issues see Ovádek, Willemyns et al (n 21) 376. 
46 Letter of Prime Minister Boris Johnson to European Council President Donald 
Tusk (19 August 2019) <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/ 
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/826166/20190819_PM_letter_to_H
is_Excellency_Mr_Donald_Tusk.pdf > accessed 6 September 2019. 
47 Article 50 TUE procedure introduce a general duty to negotiate. See Opinion of 
AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona, Wightman v Secretary of State for Exiting the 
European Union, [2018] ECLI: EU:C:2018:978, para 97. 
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the Union after its exit. The 'structural limitation in the Article 50 procedure' 
allowed this outcome.48 
The negotiation of a trade deal replacing the participation of a WTO 
member in a customs union is something new in the realm of FTAs. The 
starting point of every negotiation of a trade deal are the existing WTO 
commitments of the parties involved, intending to build within the 
framework of Article XXIV GATT a closer integration between their 
economies. The standard objective is the elimination of duties and other 
restrictive regulations of trade in goods49 and possibly an extension of the free 
trade area to services, and various other matters (investment, competition 
policy, intellectual property and so forth). In the case of Brexit, the situation 
is reversed: the starting point is that both parties participate in a customs 
union and the EU's single market, the deepest form of economic integration 
between sovereign states in existence. The negotiations between the EU and 
the UK are aimed at reducing the current level of full liberalisation, 
reintroducing barriers to trade.  
The Political Declaration on trade in goods has, however, not solved the 
tension between the aspirations of the UK to run an independent trade 
policy and avoid border checks on UK-EU trade, and the aspirations of the 
EU to preserve the unity of its customs territory and the integrity of the 
Good Friday agreement.  
 
48 Kenneth Armstrong, 'An 'Implementation Protocol' to Unblock the Brexit 
Process: A Proposal for a Legal Bridge between a Revised Political Declaration and 
the Withdrawal Agreement' (2019) University of Cambridge Faculty of Law 
Research Paper No. 9/2019 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3336966> accessed 5 
September 2019. 
49 Art. XXIV (8) GATT allows customs unions and free trade areas only when duties 
and other restrictive regulations of commerce are eliminated on 'substantially all 
the trade' in goods originating in the territories of the parties. 'One concerns the 
meaning of the term "substantially all the trade" on which barriers between the 
parties must be eliminated. In purely quantitative terms, many earlier regional 
trade agreements liberalized as little as 70–80 per cent of trade; more recent 
agreements liberalize around 90–95 per cent of trade. There has never been an 
agreement on the volume of trade that must be liberalized under WTO rules.'; 
Lorand Bartels, 'Regional Trade Agreements' (2013) Max Planck Encyclopaedia of 
Public International Law [MPEPIL]. 
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The binding and default trade arrangements set out in the backstop 
provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement heavily shaped the terms of the 
political declaration. As it results from paragraph 23 of the Political 
Declaration on tariffs:  
The economic partnership should ensure no tariffs, fees, charges or 
quantitative restrictions across all sectors, with ambitious customs 
arrangements that, in line with the Parties' objectives and principles above, 
build and improve on the single customs territory provided for in the 
Withdrawal Agreement which obviates the need for checks on rules of 
origin.  
While trade in goods has been prominent in the UK political debate 
concerning the future relations with the Union, the less debated future 
regulation of trade of services will affect much more the UK economy, since 
services account for nearly 80 per cent of the UK's GDP.50 The Political 
Declaration, following the UK position manifested in the Chequers Plan, 
adopts the downgrading from the single market model to a model of service 
liberalisation closer to the GATS, including the full sector coverage opposed 
to the selective approach proposed by the UK. The Political Declaration 
states that the future deal  
should include provisions on market access and national treatment under 
host state rules for the Parties' service providers and investors, as well as 
address performance requirements imposed on investors. This would ensure 
that the Parties' services providers and investors are treated in a non-
discriminatory manner, including with regard to establishment.51  
The baseline of negotiations seems to be the EU Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) level of market access and national treatment according to GATS. 
 
50 'Services are the sector that account for the largest part of the economy – in 2017, 
they accounted for 79% of economic output, the production sector for 14%, 
construction for 6% and agriculture for 1%', House of Commons Library, Research 
briefing, Components of GDP: Key Economic Indicators (10 April 2019). In 2017 
services accounted for 45 per cent of total UK exports, £277 billion. The EU 
received 40 per cent of British services exports, the highest proportion of any UK 
trading partner. Unlike goods, where it runs a deficit, the UK ran a total trade 
surplus in services of £112 billion. Office of National Statistics (ONS), UK balance 
of payments, The Pink Book: 2018. 
51 Political Declaration (n 17) para 31. 
 
206 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Special Issue 
 
 
The need  for an explicit reference to the establishment of service providers 
and investors is a consequence of the end of the free movement of persons. 
In addition, the temporary entry and stay of natural persons for business 
purposes, in defined areas, would be part of the service arrangements.52  
As is well known, the main barriers to the liberalisation of services are 
regulatory. Unlike the free movement of goods, the EU single market for 
services is not completely realized and regulatory barriers persist in the EU.53 
The light regime of 'voluntary regulatory cooperation in areas of mutual 
interest, including exchange of information and sharing of best practice' 
delineated by the Declaration is going to expose UK service providers 
operating in the EU market to Member States' regulatory barriers. These are 
illegal within the single market, and the UK will be left without the judicial 
protection EU citizens and businesses enjoy in case of violation of EU law.  
A specific section concerns the financial services trade. The best outcome to 
be expected is market access based on reciprocal 'equivalence'. From an EU 
perspective, equivalence means that access to the internal market is admitted 
only for third country firms complying with their national rules that are 
deemed 'equivalent' to EU rules. The European Commission unilaterally, 
discretionally and constantly reviews the equivalence decisions. Of course, 
this will be the same for the UK, but the cost for London-based financial 
actors to lose free access to the EU27 market is much higher than the cost for 
the EU financial firms to lose free access to the UK market.54  
 
52 Ibid para 32. 
53 Panagiotis Delimatsis, 'From Sacchi to Uber: 60 years of Services Liberalization, 
Ten Years of the Services Directive in the EU' (2018) 37 YEL 192. 
54 Michaela Hohlmeier and Christian Fahrholz, 'The Impact of Brexit on Financial 
Markets—Taking Stock' (2018) 6(3) Int J Financial Stud 65: 'Around 8000 financial 
companies from the EU27 Member States use EU passports for their activities in 
the UK and just under 23, 500 EU passports for their financial services and products 
(Financial Conduct Authority 2016). In the opposite direction, 5500 British 
companies use EU passports for their activities in EU27 countries and around 
335,000 EU passports for their financial services and products.' 
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6. What next? Options for the UK and the EU in an orderly exit scenario 
Although the UK Parliament has rejected the Withdrawal Agreement 
negotiated by the Government, also the option of leaving the EU without a 
deal has been ruled out.55 Since the EU27 has ruled out (at least as per the end 
of September 2019) the option of reopening negotiations on the Withdrawal 
Agreement,56 the three most likely scenarios are the following: 
1) The UK Parliament approves the Withdrawal Agreement as it is 
(maybe after another short extension) and negotiations for the future 
trade agreement begins once the UK ceases to be an EU Member 
State;  
2) The UK and the EU agree on a further long Article 50 extension and 
on continuing the UK's EU membership until an acceptable 
alternative to the backstop will be in place to meet the shared UK-EU 
objective of preventing a hard border returning between Northern 
Ireland and Ireland; or 
3) The UK withdraws by default without a deal, as nothing else is agreed 
– so-called 'hard Brexit'.  
In any scenario, it is crucial for the UK to adopt a clear approach to the future 
trade relations with the EU. The Political Declaration is a compromise 
between the UK approach to innovative form of cooperation and the EU 
preference to pattern future relations with the UK on existing FTA models. 
Such models are offered by the recently negotiated agreement between the 
EU and Canada (CETA) and by the European third countries-style 
relationship, such as the European Economic Area (EEA) which brings 
together the EU, Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein. The reference in the 
Political Declaration to the ending of free movement of people between the 
UK and EU and the development of an independent trade policy for the UK 
are non-binding and the UK and EU could move beyond these parameters in 
a future agreement. 
 
55 For a detailed account of the UK Parliament votes on the withdrawal agreement 
and alternatives options, see House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper, 'Brexit: 
Proposals for the future UK-EU relationship', 08483, (17 April 2019) 10-19. 
56 European Council (Art 50) Conclusion (April 10, 2019), EUCO XT 20015/19. 
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In fact, the House of Commons debate on the future relationship with the 
EU covered a wider range of options, including the customs union and EEA 
single market membership. These are, however, incompatible with the 
statements in the Political Declaration. The Parliamentary debate did not 
lead to a majority on one specific model to pursue in the negotiation on the 
new trade agreement with the EU,57 leaving all the viable options open. 
The so-called 'Canada model' is the option nearest to the framework 
designed by the Political Declaration. The baseline is given by the WTO 
commitments and the process is intended to deliver additional liberalisation 
of the market on a sector-by-sector approach. For trade in goods, this kind of 
agreements eliminates existing tariffs on industrial products in general, but 
the agricultural and food market liberalisation is more limited. 
Differentiations in goods treatment compels border controls. In trade in 
services, the extent of liberalisation is even more limited than for trade in 
goods. CETA, for example, does not involve commitments that really go 
beyond the WTO baseline, being limited to 'binding the actual level of 
liberalisation in the open economies of Canada and the EU.'58   
What should be the starting point for negotiations of an FTA between the 
EU and the UK? The current deep level of integration resulting from UK 
membership of the single market will be subject to a reverse-liberalisation 
process. The negotiations will necessarily result in a reduction of the actual 
level of market access for goods and services and the existing level of 
deregulation and regulatory alignment. The Canada model would allow the 
UK to develop its own trade policy, but reducing integration with the EU 
risks weakening the UK economy, especially due to the loss of unimpeded 
access to the European internal market. Even if it were able to conclude 
FTAs with its other major trade partners promptly, it is not clear whether the 
UK would be able to compensate for the economic disadvantage deriving 
from leaving the single market, especially if this would happen without a 
custom union or a strong FTA with the EU. 
 
57 On the indicatives votes of Commons on the future relationships, see (n 55) 16. 
58 European Commission (Directorate-General for Trade), 'The Economic Impact 
of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)', Luxemburg 
(2017) 22. 
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In any case, a Canada-type deal between the UK and the EU would imply 
border checks and customs controls at the Ireland-Northern Ireland border. 
Thus, such a solution would not be compatible with the backstop between 
the EU and the UK as envisaged by Article 2 of the Protocol on 
Ireland/Northern Ireland. In view of the refusal of the UK Government to 
accept Northern Ireland remaining in a common regulatory area for goods 
and customs with the rest of the EU, other types of partnership have been 
discussed.  
The first one is the so-called 'Turkey model', based on a customs union which 
covers industrial goods but excludes agriculture.59 This regime creates an 
'asymmetrical' relationship since the EU's external tariff is extended to 
Turkey; when the EU enters into a trade deal, Turkey automatically opens its 
goods market to the third country, without benefitting from preferential 
access in return.60 The current model of customs union could be upgraded in 
a 'Turkey plus' in which the UK and the EU would negotiate together the 
new trade agreements with third countries. It would be difficult for the EU 
to accept such a solution because it would grant to the UK a veto power or a 
conditional say on trade deals that EU Member States do not enjoy. This is 
because the EU customs union is an area of exclusive competence (Article 3 
TFEU) and for the negotiation and conclusion of such agreements, the 
Council decides by qualified majority (Article 207, paragraph 4). In any case, 
a customs union, even in an upgraded version of the current Turkey model, 
would prevent the UK from pursuing an autonomous and independent trade 
policy.  
The backstop impasse has revived one of the first options supported by the 
EU: the 'Norway scenario'.61 This is the softer EU exit solution because the 
UK, becoming part of the EEA or in a similar agreement, would remain in the 
EU single market but at the same time would manage its own external trade 
 
59 Steve Peers, 'Living in the Sin: Legal Integration under the EC-Turkey CU' (1996) 
EJIL 411. 
60 Ç Nas and Y Özer, Turkey and EU Integration: Achievements and Obstacles (Routledge 
2017), especially Chapter 2. 
61 The Common Market 2.0 cross party MP's Group, A Brexit deal everyone can 
support (March 2019) <http://betterbrexit.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/ 
Common-Market-2.0.pdf> accessed on 18 June 2019. 
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relations. The EU's common external tariff would not apply to the UK and 
the UK would be free to negotiate its own FTAs and economic partnerships. 
The Norway solution would have the merit to maintain UK access to the EU 
market of services, and a commitment to free movement would enable the 
process of keeping a soft border between Northern Ireland and the Irish 
Republic. Being part of the single market would prevent all the regulatory 
controls, and the border controls would be limited to customs – unless the 
UK decides to include a customs union with the EU – so-called 'Norway 
plus'. Moreover, the adoption of a tested model through an existing 
multilateral treaty would accelerate the negotiation, reducing the length of 
any kind of transition. 
On the other hand, the Norway model is the less popular among Brexiteers 
because it entails free movement of people and high levels of integration with 
the EU, especially on the regulatory side. Indeed, EEA membership involves 
implementation of EU rules relating to the single market without any 
decision-making role in their formation for the associated countries. Not to 
mention the financial contribution to the EU required from the EEA 
members. 
III. WTO RULES AND THE UK'S INTERNATIONAL TRADE RELATIONS 
FRAMEWORK POST-BREXIT 
1. Trade with the EU in case of no-deal 
In case of a no-deal the UK would immediately, upon exit from the EU, be 
subject to all WTO rules as a full 'independent' member of the Organisation. 
The WTO regime that would govern the UK-EU trade relations would be 
the same as the one that will be generally applicable between the UK and the 
rest of the world post-Brexit, until an FTA of a sort would be agreed. 
This is in sharp contrast with the current situation. As between the UK and 
the rest of the EU, the WTO multilateral rules are currently inapplicable 
because the EU Member States are part of the customs union governed by 
EU law in conformity with Art. XXIV GATT. In respect of the EU, the UK 
situation post-Brexit in this case would be similar to that of any other WTO 
member which has no trade agreement in place with the EU. The EU custom 
tariff, according to its list of commitments ('schedule') at the WTO, would 
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apply as UK custom tariff to UK exports to the EU (and vice versa) and to any 
other WTO member.62 This is the MFN tariff applicable to exports into the 
EU from any member of the WTO with which the EU has no comprehensive 
trade agreement, such is the case currently in respect of the USA, Australia 
or New Zealand.  
The UK may not unilaterally apply a zero-tariff on imports from the EU (as 
it has hastily been suggested by some non-experts) without extending such a 
regime to all other WTO members in compliance with the MFN principle.63 
All other WTO disciplines, such as the WTO Agreement on Anti-Dumping, 
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the Agreement on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), would apply reciprocally 
between the UK and the EU in the absence of specific bilateral agreements 
in this respect. The EU would be able to levy anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties against UK exports sold at less than their "normal" 
value or subsidized, applying the rules and procedures of its anti-dumping and 
anti-subsidy regulations. The UK could do the same once it has established 
an anti-dumping authority able to perform anti-dumping and countervailing 
investigations in compliance with WTO rules. 
As to imports, the UK will apply its post-Brexit trade policy, custom 
regulation and custom duties (tariffs) to imports from the EU at the initially 
applicable rate. This will in fact be the one set by the EU, as the UK has – for 
obvious practical reasons – decided to initially apply as its own the regime 
currently in force for it as a member of the EU.64  
 
62 The average tariff is estimated to amount to 4-5 per cent ad valorem on average on 
industrial goods: WTO, ITC and UNCTAD, 'World Tariff Profiles 2018 – 
Applied MFN tariffs' <https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/tariff 
_profiles18_e.pdf> 81, accessed 23 May 2019. 
63 See Stuart Harbinson, 'Leaving On WTO Terms' – Lifting Some Of The Fog', UK 
Trade Forum (9 February 2019) <https://uktradeforum.net/2019/02/09/> accessed 
23 May 2019; answering to Global Britain & Labour Leave, '30 Truths about leaving 
on WTO terms' (9 February 2019) <https://globalbritain.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2019/01/GBLL-paper-30-Truths-Final-05.01.19.pdf> accessed 23 
May 2019. 
64 See Joint letter from the EU and the UK Permanent Representatives to the WTO, 
11 October 2017 <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/joint-letter-eu-
and-uk-permanent-representatives-wto_en> accessed 23 May 2019. On 24 July 
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2. UK Trade with non-EU countries under the WTO post-Transition Period or in 
case of no-deal 
It should be recalled that the UK, which was an original contracting party of 
the GATT in 1947, is also an original member of the WTO, as is the EU in its 
own right, by virtue of both the WTO Agreement and EU law. The WTO 
Agreement, comprising the agreement establishing the WTO and the 
various multilateral and plurilateral agreements annexed to it, have been 
concluded and ratified as 'mixed agreements', that is, also by all the individual 
members of the EU. There is thus no issue of state succession, nor any need 
for admission of the UK as an individual member of the international 
organization.65 The UK was, is and remains a member of the WTO so that 
the EU schedule, which is also currently the UK's schedule, remains its 
schedule.  
The UK will be able to act, from the day that Brexit is effective, as a full-
fledged WTO member, participating in its bodies, in any negotiations (with 
the limits of being part of a custom union with the EU or other WTO 
members, should this be the case), and as a party in dispute settlement 
proceedings. However, should the Withdrawal Agreement ultimately be 
agreed and enter into force, during the Transition Period the UK's ability to 
negotiate tariff deals ('concessions') will be limited by the fact that it will still 
be part of the EU custom union. The UK will also be able to participate in 
other negotiations. The UK has immediately seized this opportunity by 
negotiating its accession to the plurilateral Government Procurement 
Agreement (GPA), in which the UK participates currently as a member of 
the EU. As agreed on 27 November 2018 with its other 18 members (not 
counting the EU and its Member States), the UK has replicated its current 
 
2018 the UK submitted its goods schedule for certification at the WTO and on 3 
December 2018  the UK completed the same step for its services schedule. The 
schedules were published on 7 December 2018 at <https://www.gov.uk/ 
government/publications/uk-goods-and-services-schedules-at-the-wto> accessed 
23 May 2019. 'The schedule seeks to replicate UK's existing commitments under 
the GATS and gives overseas businesses the same level of guaranteed access to the 
UK service sector as they currently have.' UK Government, Press release (3 
December 2018) <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/liam-fox-submits-
services-schedule-to-wto> accessed 23 May 2019.  
65 Sacerdoti (n 39) 82. 
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market access coverage under the EU schedule with minor technical 
adjustments, effective at the end of the transition period.66 
As mentioned above, initially the UK custom regime and specifically the 
custom duties will be those applying under the EU Common Custom tariff at 
exit day or at the end of the transition period. The UK will of course be free 
to change it – and intends to do so – in the absence of a custom union with 
the EU, at the end of the transition period or after the end of the backstop. 
The Trade Bill, introduced on 7 November 2017, represents a significant step 
in preparing to leave the EU. It aims at putting in place essential legal powers 
and structures to enable the UK to operate an independent trade policy. The 
Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act, which received Royal Assent on 13 
September 2018, establishes a standalone customs regime and ensures that 
VAT and excise arrangements operate effectively upon EU exit. It also 
contains trade-related tax measures. 
In theory, other WTO members should not be able to object to having the 
EU (EU28) split between the EU27 and the UK since, in principle, this would 
not affect negatively the original, previous balance of benefits and 
obligations. Establishing a new WTO schedule would entail instead a 
painstaking process of negotiations, which would not necessarily lead to 
replicating the EU schedule, especially if the UK aimed to obtain more 
concessions from other members than those reflected in the schedule in 
force (or vice-versa).67 
This approach has been expressed in the joint UK and EU letter of 11 October 
2017, where it states: 
Specifically, the EU and UK intend to maintain the existing levels of market 
access available to other WTO Members. To this end, we intend that the 
future EU's (excluding the UK) and the UK's (outside the EU) quantitative 
commitments in the form of tariff-rate quotas be obtained through an 
 
66 'UK set to become a party to the Government Procurement Agreement in its own 
right' (www.wto.org, 27 February 2019) <www.wto.org/english/news_e/ 
news19_e/gpro_27feb19_e.htm, accessed 5 September 2019> accessed 6 September 
2019.   
67 See Anwarul Hoda, Tariff Negotiations and Renegotiations under the GATT and the 
WTO: Procedures and Practices (WTO Internal Only) (Cambridge University Press 
2018). 
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apportionment of the EU's existing commitments, based on trade flows 
under each tariff-rate quota. 68  
However, the EU/UK proposal has been met with some opposition at the 
WTO. Individual countries have considered that an apportionment of 
existing commitments even if based on actual trade flows data would cause 
them prejudice.69 The most complex issue, which is clearly addressed by the 
EU and the UK in their joint letter, is the apportionment between the EU 
and the UK of the EU tariff rate quotas (TRQs) in force with many suppliers 
of agricultural products. The UK and the EU have agreed to split the existing 
quotas on the basis of the UK's share of the total EU imports of each product 
under the TRQs over a recent three-year period. The putting into force of 
the new TRQs, however, needs in principle the agreement of the 
beneficiaries, following completion of negotiations with WTO members 
having a principal or substantial supplying interest in relation to each tariff 
rate quotas under Article XXVIII GATT. Most of these members have 
objected on various grounds, arguing that their access to the henceforth-
separate UK market would be diminished and challenging the three-year 
period basis chosen by the EU and the UK.70 In fact different WTO 
members currently benefiting from a given EU TRQs may have – and do have 
 
68 Joint letter to the WTO (n 64). 
69 'While the US is supportive of the UK establishing itself as an independent 
member of the WTO, it will not accept an EU-UK approach to TRQs that is 
prejudicial to our existing rights' the USA said at the WTO Council for Trade in 
Goods meeting this week, according to a Geneva-based trade official. 'The current 
approach to Brexit TRQ negotiations is unacceptable and we are eager to engage 
[with the EU] to ensure our rights are maintained'; Hannah Monicken, 'U.S. and 
others urge UK, EU to address TRQs during Brexit extension', Inside U.S. Trade, 
Washington (19 April 2019). 
70 In the WTO Council for Trade on Goods on 12 November 2018 more than 20 
countries registered their objections on the EU-UK joint proposal, see for a 
summary <https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/good_12nov18_e.htm> 
accessed 23 May 2019. Similar objections had been voiced at the WTO Market 
Access Committee held in October 2018 by the U.S., Russia, Australia, Japan, 
China and Canada, that are almost all major agricultural exporters, see for a 
summary <https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/mark_11oct18_e.htm> 
accessed 23 May 2019.  
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– a different interest towards the EU27 and the UK markets, depending upon 
their established trade flows and commercial relations.  
In view of these difficulties, the EU has therefore decided to proceed 
unilaterally for the time being, adopting on 30 January 2019 an ad hoc 
Regulation based on the abovementioned principles.71 The EU remains 
committed to continue to negotiate at the WTO in order to reach 
satisfactory agreements using the delegation granted to the Commission in 
Regulation 2019/216 to amend the TRQs this context.72  
3. UK agreements with WTO members post-Brexit 
It is accepted that when EU law ceases to apply to the UK, deal or no-deal, 
the UK will not be able to remain a member in its own right of any EU FTA 
or other similar trade agreement currently applicable to the UK as an EU 
member whose territory is part of the EU custom territory to which such 
agreements apply.73 The bilateral FTAs and similar 'Partnership' agreements 
currently applicable to the UK could not become trilateral and cover the UK 
after it has ceased to be a EU member and its territory is no more 'equated' 
to that of the EU, as during the Transition period under Article 129 of the 
Withdrawal Agreement discussed in the next paragraph. The EU 
Commission has officially informed interested parties that 'as of the 
withdrawal date, the EU preferential trade agreements with third countries 
in the field of the common commercial policy and customs no longer apply to 
the UK'.74  
 
71 Regulation (EU) 2019/216 on the apportionment of tariff rate quotas included in 
the WTO schedule of the Union following the withdrawal of the United Kingdom 
from the Union, and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 32/2000, [2019] OJ 
L38. 
72 WTO Committee on Agriculture (26-27 February 2019), for a summary of the 
meeting see <https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/agcom_06mar19 
_e.htm> accessed 23 May 2019. 
73 Sacerdoti (n 39) 81. 
74 See European Commission, 'Notice to Stakeholders. Withdrawal of the UK and 
the EU Rules in the field of customs and external trade, Preferential rules of origin' 
(4 June 2018) <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/june/tradoc_156913. 
pdf.> accessed 23 May 2019. 
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One must distinguish the transition period, if any, from the subsequent 
period in time when the UK would not be part of any customs union with the 
EU (except if the backstop would enter fully into force). As mentioned above, 
in this period the UK will not  be a member of the EU anymore. However, it 
will maintain a single custom union with the EU. In view of the peculiar 
features of this arrangement one could say that the EU custom territory to 
which EU FTAs and similar agreements are applicable will still include the 
UK. The issue has been resolved, at least in the bilateral relations, by Article 
129 of the Withdrawal Agreement:  
during the transition period, the UK shall be bound by the obligations 
stemming from the international agreements concluded by the Union, by 
Member States acting on its behalf or by the Union and its Member States 
acting jointly.  
This requires that the other parties agree to consider the UK as still 
belonging to the territory to which the agreement applies. However, as 
mentioned above, any third country could challenge this framework and 
decide not to go on applying the current agreements with the EU to the UK.75 
Should this be the case, EU FTA partner countries may consider UK goods 
(or even EU goods having UK content) not qualifying any more as having EU 
preferential origin. UK inputs incorporated in goods obtained in third 
countries with which the EU has a preferential trade arrangement and 
imported in the EU will be 'non-originating' with the effect that the whole 
product may not qualify in the EU as having a preferential origin.76 
The UK is seeking to establish links with major economies to replace the 
FTAs covering a sizeable share of its non-EU international trade and has been 
negotiating with a host of third countries starting in 2018-2019. The EU 
participates in around 40 FTAs with over 70 countries. According to UK 
Government, '[i]n 2017, ONS [Office for National Statistics] data showed 
that trade with third countries with EU free trade agreements accounted for 
around 12 [per cent] of the UK's total trade.'77 Since these agreements provide 
 
75 See para 2.4. 
76 European Commission (n 74).  
77 Guidance of the Department of International Trade and others on 'Existing trade 
agreements if the UK leaves the EU with no deal' (19 December 2018) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/existing-free-trade-agreements-if-
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benefits to businesses, consumers and investors in terms of reductions in 
import tariff rates and regulatory requirements for goods, access to the 
service market and to public procurement and protection for intellectual 
property, the strategy of the UK Government is to seek to replicate EU trade 
agreements to ensure continuity to UK business to trade on preferential 
terms after the withdrawal.78 Not all of the EU's trade partners have, as yet, 
accepted to enter in the roll-over agreements.79 In any case the concluded 
agreements are transitional towards new trade deals to be negotiated when 
the UK's partnership with the EU is decided and the UK negotiation leverage 
assessed.80 
In relation to the post-transition period there are two further issues to be 
discussed. First, such agreements can enter into force only starting from the 
day when the UK will not be bound in a custom union with the EU as 
provided by the single EU-UK custom area during the transition period.81 If 
this regime will go on due to the entry into force of the backstop, this 
deadline will be postponed accordingly. Secondly, prospective candidates to 
negotiations need to know what kind of FTA, if any, the UK will conclude 
with the EU before being in a position of engaging in such negotiations. 
'Rolling-over' the present regime under the EU FTAs seems a quick solution 
in respect of countries with which the UK has currently FTAs in place as a 
member of the EU,  but several of those governments have signalled that a 
permanent agreement will require renegotiation and more concessions from 
 
theres-no-brexit-deal/existing-free-trade-agreements-if-theres-no-brexit-deal> 
accessed 23 May 2019. 
78 Ibid.  
79 For the list of the Trade Agreements signed by UK see Guidance of the 
Department of International Trade and others on 'Existing trade agreements if the 
UK leaves the EU with no deal' (22 August 2019) available at 
<https://www.gov.uk/guidance/uk-trade-agreements-with-non-eu-countries-in-a-
no-deal-brexit> accessed on 6 September 2019. 
80 See article 8 of the Trade Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Swiss Confederation (11 February 2019).  
81 See Art 129.4: 'during the transition period, the UK may negotiate, sign and ratify 
international agreements entered into in its own capacity in the areas of exclusive 
competence of the Union, provided those agreements do not enter into force or 
apply during the transition period, unless so authorized by the Union'. 
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the UK.82 In fact, the negotiating weight of the UK is not comparable to that 
of the EU. 
It is no surprise, therefore, that in principle only two agreements have so-far 
been reached with important partners, namely Switzerland and Israel.83 They 
are two countries that have important links with the EU but at the same time 
face periodic problems in streamlining their relations with this "big brother". 
This is a fate that may be similar to the one awaiting the UK. In case of a no-
deal scenario, UK imports and exports with countries with which the UK has 
not finalized a trade agreement would be subject to tariff at the current EU 
MFN rate. The UK also has an interest in negotiating FTAs with countries 
with which the EU has no agreement, at least not yet, such as the USA, 
Australia and New Zealand. Notwithstanding this early start, negotiations 
with the USA, the most important prospective partner, do not look easy. 
Especially US  agricultural sectors have signalled that they expect an easier 
entry for their products, quotas, tariffs and standards than has been the case 
until now with the EU.84 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Conclusively, our analysis shows that 'taking back control' and establishing 
an independent trade policy is not and will not be an easy task for the UK. 
Above all, the type of relation the UK will establish with the EU impacts on 
the choices and contents of future trade agreement between the UK and the 
rest of the world. Even in case of no-deal Brexit, the dominant importance 
for the UK economy of trade flows towards EU will de facto limit the choices 
available to the UK in its trade negotiations with the rest of world.
 
82 See the Editorial Board, 'Britain faces a bumpy road ahead at the WTO', Financial 
Times (2 November 2018). 
83 By 22 August 2019 UK had signed twelve trade agreements and the one with South 
Korea is announced to be agreed in principle. Guidance of the Department of 
International Trade on 'Existing trade agreements if the UK leaves the EU with no 
deal' (n 79). 
84 US Trade Representative, 'United States-United Kingdom Negotiations Summary 
of [US] Specific Negotiating Objectives' (February 2019) <https:// 
ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Summary_of_U.S.-UK_Negotiating_Objectives.pdf>  
accessed 23 May 2019.  
